# Pereyaslav 1654: The Myth of "Reunification"

> The myth of the 1654 "reunification of Ukraine with Russia": Pereyaslav was a military protectorate, one of Khmelnytsky's alliances, and the lands were split only by the 1686 Eternal Peace.

Canonical: https://holospravdy.com/en/pereyaslav-1654-reunification-myth
Period: raniy-noviy-chas | Type: spoke | Updated: 2026-06-21

**TL;DR.** The Soviet cliché "the reunification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654" presents the Council of Pereyaslav as a reunion of "fraternal peoples" who had supposedly always longed to be together. In reality, Ukraine and Russia had never before been a single state[1]. Pereyaslav was not a merger but a **military protectorate** — one of a whole series of alliances that Bohdan Khmelnytsky sought against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: Crimea, Moldavia, Sweden, Transylvania[4][5]. And the Ukrainian lands themselves were divided not in 1654 but only by the Eternal Peace of 1686 — along the Dnipro, between Moscow and Poland[6].

## The myth

The formula "reunification" (Russian *vossoyedineniye Ukrainy s Rossiyey*) is a cornerstone of Soviet historiography: the Council of Pereyaslav of 1654 is presented as the act by which two "fraternal peoples" were finally joined after a centuries-long separation. In the logic of the myth, the union was natural and final, and everything that followed was merely the restoration of an eternal unity.

## Correction one: there was nothing to "reunify"

"Reunification" presupposes a prior unity — and none existed. Ukraine and modern Russia had never been a single state before 1654[1]. The Ukrainian statehood of that era — the **Zaporozhian Host** — arose as an autonomous entity under the mace of Bohdan Khmelnytsky within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under the Treaty of Zboriv of 1649[2]. It was a separate polity with its own army and governance, not a "part of Russia" returning somewhere.

## Correction two: Pereyaslav was a protectorate, not a merger

In 1654 Khmelnytsky withdrew from the authority of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and went over to the protectorate of the Tsardom of Muscovy[3]. The key word is **protectorate**: it is a form of military-political alliance with a suzerain, not a dissolution into his state. The Hetmanate retained its own order; the matter concerned protection and a joint war against Poland, not the abolition of Ukrainian subjecthood.

That this was a pragmatic step rather than an expression of "brotherhood" is clear from the fact that Moscow was merely one of a series of allies. The first ally of the Zaporozhian Host was the Crimean Khanate (Khan Islam Giray); next Khmelnytsky built an alliance with Moldavia — his son Tymish married Roxandra, the daughter of the Moldavian hospodar Vasile Lupu[4]. Each such alliance had a single goal — to find an external force against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

## Correction three: the alliance with Moscow quickly fell apart

If 1654 had truly been a "reunification forever", history would have ended there. Instead, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich broke the terms of the treaty by concluding a separate Truce of Vilnius with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then Khmelnytsky again sought other allies — the Swedish king Charles X and the Transylvanian prince George II Rákóczi[5]. The last joint campaign — the regiment of Anton Zhdanovych together with Rákóczi — was surrounded and defeated in 1657; in the same year Khmelnytsky died[5]. The alliance with Moscow turned out to be just another temporary coalition, not a merger of peoples.

## Correction four: division, not unity

The outcome of the struggle for the Ukrainian lands was not "unity" but dismemberment. Only in 1686 did the Eternal Peace between Moscow and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth divide Ukraine along the Dnipro: the Right Bank went to Poland, the Left Bank together with Kyiv remained with the Tsardom of Muscovy[6]. In other words, the real consequence of the Muscovite "protectorate" was not a reunified people but a country cut in half.

## What professional historiography clarifies

That Pereyaslav was an alliance and not a merger is also confirmed by the professional historiography of the Hetmanate. The historian [Viktor Horobets](/en/persons/viktor-horobets) emphasizes: 1654 did not put an end to Cossack statehood — the incorporation of Ukraine into the "body" of the Muscovite state was a long, non-linear process that stretched over centuries[7]. The Council of Pereyaslav itself, on 8 January 1654, was not the signing of a treaty: only an oath was taken there, while the real terms were worked out later. The hetman's 23-point draft was taken to Moscow, where it was reduced to an 11-point treaty — the **March Articles**; the original has not survived, only a draft remains[8].

These articles defined the status of **political autonomy**: nominally the tsar was recognized as supreme ruler, but in fact the Hetmanate retained its own administration and laws, while the presence of tsarist authority was purely symbolic — a voivode in Kyiv merely embodied suzerainty[9]. This directly contradicts the picture of "reunification", in which Ukraine supposedly dissolved into Muscovy as early as 1654.

At the same time, this is precisely where the future vulnerability lay. From the outset, each side invested the alliance with its own meaning — and this divergence, according to Horobets, became the "sword of Damocles" of all the subsequent history. Taking advantage of the internal struggle within the Hetmanate, in 1659 Moscow imposed on Yurii Khmelnytsky a falsified, expanded version of the "Articles of Bohdan", which forbade the Cossacks independent diplomatic relations and the declaration of war or peace without the tsar's permission[10]. Thus the contractual political autonomy was step by step reduced to an administrative one — and then came the era of the Ruin.

## What Khmelnytsky was actually building: his own dynasty

It is easiest to see that Moscow was for Khmelnytsky an **instrument** and not a goal if one looks at what kind of state he wanted to build in the first place. And what he wanted was not a "reunification" with anyone but **his own dynastic state on the model of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth**. The logic of the era was simple: without a ruling dynasty, a polity was not yet considered a full-fledged state. At first the hetman tried to embed the Cossacks into the Commonwealth's system — to win noble rights for them; when that failed, the idea arose of creating a **classic dynastic monarchy of the European type**[11].

It was here, and not toward "brotherhood with Moscow", that his most ambitious foreign move led — the **Moldavian** one. The marriage of his elder son **Tymish** to **Roxandra**, daughter of the Moldavian hospodar **Vasile Lupu** (1652), was not a chance alliance but a **dynastic combination**: according to tradition, Lupu had no male heir, so after his father-in-law's death Tymish was to become prince of Moldavia — and thus a **Khmelnytsky dynasty** would arise in a union of two states. The project was cut short by Tymish's death at Suceava in 1653[12]. (Professional historiography is more cautious here: Lupu did have a son, Ștefăniță, so it was rather a far-reaching dynastic calculation than a guaranteed succession — but the **intent** to build a dynasty is documented.)

In this light the 1654 treaty itself reads anew. If one looks not from the height of later consequences but through the eyes of the events of that time, it was a **very advantageous treaty for the hetman**: his power was practically not limited — with one exception (the ban on independent alliances with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottomans without the tsar's consent) — and the Cossack register was set at **60,000**, the largest figure in the entire war[13]. That is, Khmelnytsky took from Moscow exactly what his state project needed, rather than "merging" into a foreign state.

That Moscow was a replaceable instrument rather than a final choice was confirmed almost at once. Polish diplomacy, at the height of the "Deluge", proposed a deal to the tsar: their king Jan Casimir was ill, and the throne of the Commonwealth was **elective**, so if Moscow ended the war the Poles would **elect Alexei Mikhailovich himself as king**. Moscow agreed to this, concluding the Truce of Vilnius in 1656 — and for Khmelnytsky this was a **direct violation** of the 1654 agreements[14]. Sweden's reaction to the attempts at a new alliance is also telling: the Swedish kingdom was **dynastic** and simply did not understand with whom it was supposed to sign a treaty, since Khmelnytsky **represented no dynasty**[15]. Both episodes hit the same point: the hetman acted as an independent player shuffling allies, not as a subject who had "returned" to his natural ruler.

In the end it was precisely the **failure of the dynastic design**, and not Pereyaslav, that determined the further fate of the Hetmanate. The younger son **Yurii**, at the time of his father's death (1657), was only 16 — "a mace needs a head to go with it" (*do bulavy treba shche holovy*): he was sent to study at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, while the general clerk **Ivan Vyhovsky** was elected hetman. The dynasty did not come together — instead the Hetmanate became an **elective** state on the same Commonwealth model (as the nobility elected a king, so the Cossacks elected a hetman), and this was the case right up to the abolition of the hetmanship in 1764[16]. It is symptomatic that even the last hetman, **Kyrylo Rozumovsky** — already a Russian grandee — again tried to make the hetmanship **hereditary in his own line**; it was precisely this intent that gave **Catherine II** a pretext to force him to renounce the mace, after which the Hetmanate as a state ceased to exist[17]. Two attempts to build one's own dynasty — at the beginning and at the end — outline what the Hetmanate aspired to be: a **separate European state**, not a "reunified" part of Moscow.

## What it means

"The reunification of 1654" is a projection of later imperial subjugation onto a moment when it was still an ordinary alliance against a common enemy. Pereyaslav did not join what had been divided, because no single state existed before it; it was one of Khmelnytsky's many alliances — and, like the others, temporary. And when Moscow later began to break the contractual logic of these relations to its own advantage, this led to a different story — the conflict that the Kremlin tradition would call the ["treason"](/en/mazepa-betrayal-myth) of the hetmans.

## Citation sources

[1] paraphrase: «Украина и современная Россия никогда между собой не были объединены.» — With a Ukrainian from Nizhny Novgorod about the history of Ukraine (19.06.2023) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OiI1mOCnzk (timecodes: 11:07, 11:12)

[2] paraphrase: «Украинское государство — Войско Запорожское низовое — возникло как автономное государство во главе с Богданом Хмельницким в составе Речи Посполитой по Зборовскому договору 1649 года.» — With a Ukrainian from Nizhny Novgorod about the history of Ukraine (19.06.2023) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OiI1mOCnzk (timecodes: 11:22, 11:32)

[3] paraphrase: «В 1654 году Богдан Хмельницкий вышел из подчинения Речи Посполитой и вошёл под протекторат Московского царства; часть украинских земель вошла в состав Московии.» — With a Ukrainian from Nizhny Novgorod about the history of Ukraine (19.06.2023) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OiI1mOCnzk (timecodes: 11:36, 11:43)

[4] summary: «Первым союзником Войска Запорожского стало Крымское ханство (Ислам Гирей); затем — Молдавское княжество: сын Богдана, Тимофей Хмельницкий, женился на дочери молдавского властителя Василия Лупула.» — With a Ukrainian from Nizhny Novgorod about the history of Ukraine (19.06.2023) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OiI1mOCnzk (timecodes: 11:53, 12:00, 12:26, 12:32)

[5] summary: «Алексей Михайлович нарушил условия договора, подписав Виленское перемирие с Речью Посполитой; тогда Хмельницкий искал других союзников — шведского короля Карла и князя Дьёрдя II Ракоци. Последний поход (полк Андрея Ждановича) попал в окружение и был разбит в 1657 году; Хмельницкий умер от инсульта в том же году.» — With a Ukrainian from Nizhny Novgorod about the history of Ukraine (19.06.2023) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OiI1mOCnzk (timecodes: 14:07, 14:17, 14:30, 14:43)

[6] paraphrase: «Борьба за украинские земли закончилась только в 1686 году Вечным миром, когда Украину поделили по Днепру: правый берег отдали Речи Посполитой, левый берег вместе с Киевом остался за Московским царством.» — With a Ukrainian from Nizhny Novgorod about the history of Ukraine (19.06.2023) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5OiI1mOCnzk (timecodes: 14:57, 15:02, 15:11)

[7] paraphrase: «Немає підстав вважати, що 1654 року козацька державність припинилася й Україна стала частиною Московського царства — це був тривалий, нелінійний процес включення України в тіло Московської держави, що розтягнувся на століття.» — Historian Every Saturday: Viktor Horobets. Ukraine After Pereyaslav 1654 (02.11.2024) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-x_Z_GoT_Y (timecodes: 29:45, 30:25)

[8] summary: «У Переяславі 9–10 січня жодної угоди підписано не було — лише присяга; гетьманський проєкт із 23 пунктів повезли до Москви, де виробили договір з 11 пунктів (Березневі статті). Оригіналу немає, збереглася лише чернетка.» — Historian Every Saturday: Viktor Horobets. Ukraine After Pereyaslav 1654 (02.11.2024) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-x_Z_GoT_Y (timecodes: 35:50, 36:37)

[9] paraphrase: «Це був статус політичної автономії: номінально Україна потрапляє під протекторат московського царя, але фактично зберігає власну адміністрацію й власні закони, а присутність царя суто номінальна.» — Historian Every Saturday: Viktor Horobets. Ukraine After Pereyaslav 1654 (02.11.2024) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-x_Z_GoT_Y (timecodes: 42:54, 43:03)

[10] summary: «Кожна сторона вкладала у союз своє значення — і це стало дамокловим мечем відносин; згодом, 1659 року, Москва нав'язала сфальшований, розширений варіант статей Богдана, що забороняв самостійні дипломатичні зносини та оголошення війни чи миру без дозволу царя, — політична автономія звузилася до адміністративної.» — Historian Every Saturday: Viktor Horobets. Ukraine After Pereyaslav 1654 (02.11.2024) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0-x_Z_GoT_Y (timecodes: 34:34, 51:15, 51:29)

[11] summary: «Богдан Хмельницкий пытался создать династическое государство по образу Речи Посполитой. Он хотел иметь собственную династию, потому что без династии государство в то время не считалось государством. Сначала он пытался найти для казачества место шляхты в Речи Посполитой и добивался шляхетских прав и привилегий, но этого не получилось — тогда появилась идея создать именно династическое государство, классическое, как в Европе.» — A Short History of Ukraine 1648–1657, part 1: the dynastic plans of Khmelnytsky (26.05.2025) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2-UEywSLWg (timecodes: 03:46, 03:55, 04:03, 07:14)

[12] summary: «Была попытка создать государство в унии с Молдавским княжеством, когда его сын Тимофей Хмельницкий взял в жёны Лупул, дочь молдавского властителя князя Василия Лупула. У того не было наследника мужского пола, и после смерти тестя Тимофей Хмельницкий стал бы князем молдавским. То есть была попытка создать такую династию, династическое государство в союзе с государством Богдана Хмельницкого, но эта система провалилась.» — A Short History of Ukraine 1648–1657, part 1: the dynastic plans of Khmelnytsky (26.05.2025) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2-UEywSLWg (timecodes: 04:06, 04:17, 04:34, 04:46)

[13] summary: «Если рассматривать со стороны событий 1654 года, это был очень удобный для Богдана Хмельницкого договор, потому что его права как гетьмана практически не ограничивались. Ограничивались только в том, что он не имел права вступать в союзы с Речью Посполитой и Османской империей без разрешения московского царя, а во всё остальное московская власть практически не вмешивалась. А реестровое казачество по этому договору было 60 000 человек — самая большая цифра за годы войны.» — A Short History of Ukraine 1648–1657, part 1: the dynastic plans of Khmelnytsky (26.05.2025) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2-UEywSLWg (timecodes: 10:22, 10:37, 11:01, 11:10)

[14] summary: «Польская дипломатия направила посольство в Москву с идеей: наш король Ян Казимир болен, а король в Речи Посполитой выбирается, и мы даём гарантию, что если вы прекратите боевые действия, то мы выберем Алексея Михайловича королём Речи Посполитой. Московское царство на это пошло и подписало договор 1656 года. С точки зрения Богдана Хмельницкого это было прямое нарушение предыдущих договоров.» — A Short History of Ukraine 1648–1657, part 1: the dynastic plans of Khmelnytsky (26.05.2025) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2-UEywSLWg (timecodes: 20:56, 21:04, 21:18, 21:33)

[15] summary: «Со шведами не очень получилось, потому что шведское королевство — это династическое королевство, и подписывать договор с человеком, который не представляет никакой династии, Богдан Хмельницкий, для шведов было не совсем понятно, с кем они должны подписывать договор. Поэтому шведы практически не поддержали эту ситуацию.» — A Short History of Ukraine 1648–1657, part 1: the dynastic plans of Khmelnytsky (26.05.2025) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d2-UEywSLWg (timecodes: 22:15, 22:23, 22:31)

[16] summary: «Богдан Хмельницкий хотел, чтобы его младший сын Юрий Хмельницкий был гетьманом, хотел династическое государство по классическим лекалам Европы создать. Но Юрию Хмельницкому было 16 лет — есть классическая фраза «до булави треба ще голови»: его отправили учиться в Киево-Могилянскую академию, а выбрали гетьманом Ивана Выговского, который был при Богдане Хмельницком генеральным писарем. Династию создать не получилось — получилось по образцу Речи Посполитой: как шляхта выбирает короля, так казачество выбирало гетьмана; эта ситуация просуществовала до 1764 года, до ликвидации гетьманства Екатериной II.» — A Short History of Ukraine 1657–1921, part 2: the dynasty failed, the hetmanate became elective (28.05.2025) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HCXD4VwNvHE (timecodes: 00:18, 01:01, 01:10, 01:59, 02:23)

[17] summary: «Последний гетьман Кирилл Разумовский, по сути, российский дворянин, которого назначили гетьманом Украины. А поскольку у этого товарища появились амбициозные планы и он тоже хотел, как Богдан Хмельницкий, собственную династию создать, это наразилось на Екатерину II. Она ему сказала: либо ты отрекаешься от гетьманства, либо… Кирилл Разумовский отказался от гетьманщины, и Гетьманщина как государство перестала существовать.» — A Short History of Ukraine 1657–1921, part 2: the dynasty failed, the hetmanate became elective (28.05.2025) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HCXD4VwNvHE (timecodes: 04:29, 04:38, 04:52, 05:15)